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This paper explores the effectiveness of network attack when the attacker has imperfect infor-
mation about the network. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, we observe that dynamical importance and
betweenness centrality-based attacks are surprisingly robust to the presence of a moderate amount
of imperfect information and are more effective compared with simpler degree-based attacks even at
moderate levels of network information error. In contrast, for scale-free networks the effectiveness of
attack is much less degraded by a moderate level of information error. Furthermore, in the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi case the effectiveness of network attack is much more degraded by missing links as compared
with the same number of false links.
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Many complex dynamical processes are supported by
networks of interconnections between a large number of
individual elements (e.g., epidemics [1–4], cancer spread
[5], electrical power distribution [6, 7], etc.). Interven-
tions that seek to degrade [8–13] or protect [13–16] net-
work connectivity are thus of great interest. In partic-
ular, strategies for network attack by node or link re-
moval have been intensively studied. Key issues have
been the dependence of the attack effectiveness upon net-
work topology and the strategy for selecting nodes or
links for removal. We note, however, that, while such
previous studies have predominantly presumed the at-
tacker to have perfect knowledge of the network to be
attacked, this is very often not the case. Specifically,
networks inferred from measurements typically have false
links and miss true links. One might suppose that these
errors could very much lower the effectiveness of attack
strategies. The purpose of this paper is to address this
important issue for the case of node removal attacks of
undirected networks (directed networks are treated in the
online supplementary material [17]).
One example of a network attack problem is an at-
tempt to stop the spread of a disease with a limited
number of vaccinations: the people who receive the vac-
cinations are chosen on the basis of their position in the
social network [8–13]. Another example is that of deriv-
ing gene therapies for cancer. Here the goal is to select
those genes whose disabling would most inhibit cancer
cell survival and proliferation [18][5]. Yet another ex-
ample is the study of the resilience of the Internet to
intentional attack [8, 12]. The typical attack strategy is
to calculate some centrality measure of each node, and to
then attack (disable, vaccinate, or remove) those nodes
with the highest values of this measure. However, an
attacker with imperfect network information will deter-
mine values of these centrality measures with some er-
ror, and using these would be expected to degrade the
effectiveness of his attack. Imperfect network informa-
tion is ubiquitous in applications and can arise in various
ways. Examples of link errors can be found in online
social networks, where a friendship may be indicated de-
spite the two subjects having never personally met, or
inversely, if no online friendship exists between two face-
to-face friends. In the previously cited example of can-
cer gene therapy, genes are selected for disabling based
upon an estimated gene interaction network inferred from
noisy measurements (e.g., measurements of gene expres-
sion [19, 20]). Recently, Platig et al. studied the effects of
link errors on the correlation between network centrality
measures inferred from true and erroneous network in-
formation [21].
One conclusion of past work for the case where the
network is exactly known is that a strategy based on
the globally dependent node centrality measure of be-
tweenness (defined subsequently) is particularly effective
[9]. On the other hand, one might suspect that more
effective globally-based strategies are also less robust to
error in network knowledge. Our main conclusions are
as follows: (i) for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, strategies based
on global information are surprisingly robust and main-
tain a clear advantage over the simple node degree-based
attack up to moderate amounts of network error; (ii)
scale-free networks display much less dependence on the
attack strategy (for strategies based on sensibly chosen
centrality measures) and much less degradation of at-
tacks by network information error; (iii) for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
networks attack effectiveness is degraded much more by
missing links as compared with the same number of false
links; (iv) comparing the two global strategies that we
test, namely betweenness [22, 23] and dynamical impor-
tance [24], betweenness is often slightly more effective at
low network error (at the expense of substantially greater
computational cost), but the two tend to perform more
equally at moderate network error or a relatively small
20 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
Erdös − Rényi, α=0, δ=0
N
r
 / N
|G
C| 
/ N
 
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.5
1
Scale−Free, α=0, δ=0 
N
r
 / N
|G
C| 
/ N
 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
Erdös − Rényi, α=0.25, δ=0.25
N
r
 / N
|G
C| 
/ N
 
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.5
1
Scale−Free, α=0.25, δ=0.25 
N
r
 / N
|G
C| 
/ N
 
 
Degree
Betweenness
Dynamical Importance
Random
(c)(a)
(b) (d)
FIG. 1. The size of the GC normalized by the number of nodes N versus the normalized number of nodes removed Nr/N , for
betweenness, dynamical importance, degree, and random strategies for undirected Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and scale-free networks, both
shown with no error, and with α = δ = 0.25
number of attacked nodes; and (v) as shown in the sup-
plemental material, results (i)-(iv) demonstrated in this
paper for undirected networks also apply to directed net-
works. We next describe the numerical experiments that
yield results (i)-(iv).
Network Models. For our “true” networks, we consider
two types of random networks: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, in which
the degree (number of links to a node) has a binomial
distribution, and scale-free [25], in which the degree dis-
tribution obeys a power law:
Pk =
k−γ
kmax∑
i=1
k−γi
where Pk is the probability that a randomly chosen node
has degree k.
Centrality Measures. The three node centrality mea-
sures upon which we base attack strategies are as follows:
(i) The degree centrality, which is simply the degree of
a node.
(ii) The betweenness centrality of a node is the frac-
tion of shortest paths between all node pairs that
pass through that particular node. Let σ(s, t) be
the number of shortest paths between nodes s and
t, and σi(s, t) to be the number of shortest paths
between s and t that pass through node i. The
betweenness of node i is
bi =
∑
s,t,s6=t6=i
σi(s, t)
σ(s, t)
(iii) The dynamical importance of a node is a measure
of the change in the largest eigenvalue of the ad-
jacency matrix (which is typically real and posi-
tive) upon removal of that node. For an undirected
network, elements of the adjacency matrix A are
Aij = Aij = 1 if there is a link between nodes j
and i, and Aij = Aji = 0 otherwise. Let λ denote
the largest eigenvalue of A, so that Av = λv for
the corresponding eigenvector v. Upon removing a
node s from the network, and consequently deleting
all links attached to it, the matrix A is changed by
setting all the matrix elements in row s and column
s to zero (Ast = Ats = 0 for all t). We use ∆λs to
denote the resultant change in λ. The dynamical
importance of the node s is defined as
ds = −
∆λs
λ
with λ being the eigenvalue of the matrix before
removal of node s.
“Noisy” Network Model. We generate “noisy” net-
works from the true networks by adding false links to
the system and removing true links. (We refer to true
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FIG. 2. The normalized GC size versus the normalized number of removed nodes for betweenness and dynamical importance
strategies for undirected (a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and (b) scale-free networks.
links which have been removed as “missing” links.) Our
method for generating noisy networks is as follows [21]:
mtδ links are omitted randomly, where mt is the number
of links in the true network and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Links are only
eligible for omission if they are part of the true network;
false links added in the adding process will not be omit-
ted. While each link has an equal probability of being
deleted, higher-degree nodes have a higher probability
of losing a link, as they have more links. In addition,
mtα false links are added to the network. False links are
placed between random pairs of nodes, provided that a
link does not already exist between them in the true net-
work. Overall our false network model is characterized
by the two parameters δ and α, respectively representing
the error levels associated with missing and false links.
Description of Numerical Experiments. The networks
are of size N = 2500, with the maximum possible degree
of a node set at kmax = N/2 = 1250. The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
networks have an average degree zer = 4, and the scale-
free-degree networks have γ ≈ 2.06 and average degree
zsf = 4. In the scale-free networks, we require that the
degree of each node is at least 1. The networks are con-
structed according to the configuration model [26]. Next,
a noisy network is constructed based on the parameters
α and δ. The centrality measure is calculated from the
existing noisy network, and the highest-centrality node is
removed from both the true and noisy networks. If there
is more than one node having the same highest value
centrality measure, one of those is chosen randomly for
removal. Then, we calculate the size of the Giant Com-
ponent (GC) in the true network (The GC is the largest
collection of nodes such that any pair of nodes in the GC
is connected by a path along links.). To reiterate, the idea
here is that network attacks are based on the information
in the noisy network, but the effects of these attacks are
actually felt on the true network. After each removal, we
recalculate the centrality measure based on the new noisy
network (with the previously attacked node deleted), and
remove the highest centrality node from both networks
again, and recalculate the GC size. This process is con-
tinued until all nodes are deleted.
Results. Here, we present the results of numerical sim-
ulations exploring the effects of network information er-
rors on attack. Results are averaged over 50 different
network realizations. Figure 1 presents the size of the
giant connected component of undirected true networks
plotted against the number of nodes removed in attack
(both normalized by N) for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Scale-Free
networks, both for attacks with perfect information (Figs.
1(a) and 1(c)) and for attacks with imperfect information
(α = δ = 0.25) (Figs. 1(b) and 1(d)). We plot results
for attacks based on our three centrality measures (be-
tweenness, dynamical importance, and degree) and, as
a baseline, also include results for the case where nodes
are successively removed at random. We see that in the
case of the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks (Figs. 1(a) and 1(b)),
the betweenness and dynamical importance strategies are
significantly better than the degree and random strate-
4gies, even with an additional 25% false links added, and
25% of true links deleted.
Furthermore, we see that the betweenness strategy is
slightly more efficient than the dynamical importance
strategy in the case of no error, and they become ap-
proximately equal when error is present. In the case of
the undirected scale-free networks (Figs. 1(c) and 1(d)),
we find that the degree attack is relatively insensitive to
this moderate amount of error. Restricting attention to
reductions of the GC to as low as 10% of its original size,
in contrast with the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi case, we see that for
the scale-free case there is relatively little difference be-
tween the different strategies and relatively a much less
dramatic effect of moderate network error.
Figure 2 shows GC attack curves for undirected net-
works subjected to betweenness and dynamical impor-
tance attacks, with different types of error. Figure 2(a)
for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks shows that at moderate levels
of error, (α, δ) = (0.25, 0), (0, 0.25) and (0.25, 0.25), at-
tacks are more robust to the addition of false links as
compared with the omission of the same number of true
links. Again, while for (α, δ) = (0, 0) betweenness based
attack is somewhat more effective than dynamical im-
portance based attack, this difference essentially disap-
pears when either of the moderate error types shown are
present.
Since Figs. 1(c,d) showed quite weak effects of moder-
ate network error (α, δ) = (0.25, 0.25) for scale-free net-
works, we are lead to consider substantially higher levels
of network error for the scale-free case. Consequently,
in Fig. 2(b) we show results for scale-free networks with
(α, δ) = (0, 0), (0, 0.75), (1, 0), (1, 0.75) (note that α = 1
means that the number of added false links is the same
as the number of true links). Even at these high net-
work error values, we find little effect of network error
for reductions of the GC size by up to 0.5. For greater
reductions of the GC size network error becomes signifi-
cant, but very great GC reductions are still achieved at
relatively small Nr/N (compared with the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
case). The effective absence of network error impact
for scale-free networks and |GC|/N & 0.5 can be un-
derstood on the basis that reductions of GC size in this
range are achieved by removal of a relatively small num-
ber of nodes that have extraordinarily high betweenness
and importance centrality measures. Random addition
of false links, even if it doubles the number of perceived
links is unlikely to produce any nodes with centrality
measures as high as the true hubs, which will hence still
be highly ranked for attack. On the other hand, random
deletions with δ = 0.75, on average reduces the degrees
of all nodes, roughly proportionally, and assuming con-
nectivity is still maintained between the true hubs, they
will still by highly ranked for removal.
In conclusion, we have investigated the impact of im-
perfect network information on the effectiveness of nodal
attack based on different centrality measures (degree,
betweenness, and importance). Our results indicate
strong dependence on the network degree distribution
and on whether the network error is through false links or
through missing true links. One implication of the latter
finding is that, in the absence of hubs, network inference
from noisy data (as in the cancer gene therapy applica-
tion referred to at the beginning of the paper) should
employ a somewhat weaker threshold for link inference
(in order to favor inclusion of true links at the possi-
ble expense of the addition of false links in the inferred
network). There are many possible future extensions of
this general line of study, such as investigation of link
attacks, the impacts of other network topological char-
acteristics beyond degree distribution (e.g., assortativity
by degree [27], community structure [28], small world-
ness [29], motifs [30], network hierarchical topology [31],
and multilayer structure [32]), considerations of network
error in formulating attacks tailored to disruption of spe-
cific dynamical processes (e.g., epidemic spread), etc.
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6Supplement for “The Impact of Imperfect Information on Network Attack”
Our paper presented results, discussion and conclu-
sions on the impact of imperfect information on network
attack restricted to the case of undirected networks. Here
in Figs. S-1 and S-2 we give results for directed networks.
These figures are analogous to Figs. 1 and 2 of our paper
that were for undirected networks. To accommodate di-
rectedness there are two new aspects of Figs. S-1 and S-2
as compared with Figs. 1 and 2: (i) the curves for attack
based on degree centrality in Figs. 1 and 2 are now each
replaced by two curves, one for in-degree-based attack,
and one for out-degree-based attack; and (ii) the vertical
axes in Figs. S-1 and S-2 are the normalized size of the Gi-
ant Strongly Connected Component (GSCC) rather than
the GC of Figs. 1 and 2 (the GSCC is the largest collec-
tion of nodes such that for each pair (i, j) of nodes in the
GSCC there is a directed path along links both from i to
j and from j to i). The parameters and degree distribu-
tions used for Figs. S-1 and S-2 are similar to those for
Figs. 1 and 2: N = 2500, kinmax = k
out
max = N/2 = 1250
(where kin and kout denote in-degree and out-degree).
The average in-degree and out-degrees for all networks
are 4, and, for scale-free networks the in-degree and out-
degree distributions are the same with power-law expo-
nent γ ≈ 2 for both.
Examination of Figs. S-1 and S-2 shows that the in-
degree and out-degree strategies yield similar results.
Furthermore, and most importantly, all of our main gen-
eral results for undirected networks (points (i)-(iv) at the
end of the third paragraph of our paper) are seen to apply
to directed networks.
70 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
Erdös − Rényi, α=0, δ=0
N
r
/N
|G
SC
C|/
N
 
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.5
1
Scale−Free, α=0, δ=0 
N
r
/N
|G
SC
C|/
N
 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
Erdös − Rényi, α=0.25, δ=0.25
N
r
/N
|G
SC
C|/
N
 
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.5
1
Scale−Free, α=0.25, δ=0.25 
N
r
/N
|G
SC
C|/
N
 
 
In Degree
Out Degree
Betweenness
Dynamical Importance
Random
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
FIG. S-1. The size of the GSCC normalized by the number of nodes N versus the normalized number of nodes removed Nr/N ,
for betweenness, dynamical importance, degree, and random strategies for directed Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and scale-free networks, both
shown with no error, and with α = δ = 0.25.
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FIG. S-2. The normalized GSCC size versus the normalized number of removed nodes for betweenness (solid red line) and
dynamical importance (black dashed line) strategies for directed (a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and (b) scale-free networks.
